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1 Introduction
In a seminal contribution, Sen (1976) distinguished two fundamental issues in poverty
measurement, namely, (i) identifying the poor among the total population; and (ii) con-
structing an index of poverty using the available information on the poor. The first
problem has been solved in the literature by setting a poverty line (which may or may
not depend on the income distribution under consideration) and identifying as poor the
individuals whose incomes fall below this threshold. Regarding the second, the aggrega-
tion problem, many indices have been proposed capturing not only the fraction of the
population which is poor (the head-count ratio), that is, the incidence of poverty, but
also the extent of individual poverty and the inequality among those who are poor. The
literature on poverty measurement has advanced to a high degree of sophistication since
Sen (1976). However, there remain substantial issues to be addressed. One of these issues
is concerned with the measurement of intertemporal poverty as opposed to limiting at-
tention to single-period considerations. For instance, consider an observer comparing two
individuals both of whom are poor today to the same degree. Suppose that, while the
first was not poor in any of the previous two periods, the second individual experienced
poverty in both previous periods in addition to the present. Is the degree of intertemporal
poverty of those two individuals the same? This does not seem to be the case–the second
individual is poorer as soon as the entire intertemporal income distribution is taken into
consideration. Now consider again two individuals both of whom are poor today to the
same degree but the first was poor also last year, while the second was out of poverty
last year but in poverty the year before that. Is the intertemporal poverty of those two
individuals the same? Again, we believe not. Both individuals were poor twice (and we
are assuming that they were poor to the same degree) but the first individual experi-
enced poverty in two consecutive periods while the second did not. The relative degree
of overall poverty when comparing the two individuals over time depends on the role and
evaluation of persistence in a state of poverty. To us, the negative eﬀects of being in
poverty are cumulative, hence a two-period poverty spell is much harder to handle than
two one-period spells that are interrupted by one (or more) periods out of poverty. We
believe that intertemporal information should not be neglected in assessing individual
poverty. Nowadays, the availability of panel data for most of the countries in the world
makes it possible for researchers to expand the information set when evaluating poverty.
In addition to poverty lines, per-period poverty values and inequality among the poor,
the lengths of individual poverty spells can be incorporated. We propose a way to add
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this time dimension to the information used in poverty measurement.
This paper is similar in spirit to Hoy and Zheng (2006) but the individual intertemporal
poverty measures we characterize diﬀer from theirs due to the properties that are deemed
relevant to capture the role of time and persistence. Hoy and Zheng (2006) demand that
aggregating first across individuals and then across time periods should be equivalent
to aggregating in the reverse order–first across time periods for each single individual
and then across members of the society. This leads to a notion of path independence.
In contrast to Hoy and Zheng (2006), we consider the phenomenon of persistence to be
crucial in assessing individual intertemporal poverty. Aggregating across individuals first
means that this information is lost when we reach the second stage of aggregation. Hence
we characterize an index of intertemporal poverty for each member of the society under
analysis and then aggregate across members of society.
Foster (2007) expresses a similar view in proposing chronic poverty indices by aggre-
gating first across time. In contrast to our contribution, persistence in the state of poverty
is not assigned any relevance. The measures Foster (2007) proposes–generalizations of
the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) class that allow for time to matter–do satisfy a prop-
erty of time anonymity under which the sequencing of incomes in individual intertemporal
profiles does not aﬀect poverty. Foster (2007) defines an individual as chronically poor
if its income is below the poverty line for at least a given number of periods. Thus,
in addition to a poverty line, there is a second cut-oﬀ point in defining the chronically
poor–a point defined in terms of the incidence of poverty over time. As is the case for our
contribution, the order of aggregation matters in Foster’s approach–in order to identify
the chronically poor, the first aggregation step has to be performed across periods for
each individual. The individual Foster (2007) indices are means over time of per-period
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) indices. The aggregate indices are obtained by calculating
average poverty among the chronically poor. Recall that, in Foster (2007), only individ-
uals who are poor for at least a given number of periods are considered. Thus, if an
individual is poor, but rarely so, it is treated in the analysis as one of the individuals who
are never poor. This is not the case in the present contribution. We do not restrict our
sample to chronically poor individuals, hence we take into account spells of poverty of
any length. Foster (2007) formulates a set of axioms and discusses them in the context of
his class of measures but he does not provide a characterization. The class of measures
that we propose in this paper contains Foster’s (2007) as a special case if applied to
the chronically poor only. This corresponds to the limiting case where no importance is
given to persistence and where the per-period individual poverty indicators are the gaps
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according to the indices belonging to the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) class.
Calvo and Dercon (2007) consider intertemporal measures of individual poverty as
well. As is the case for Foster (2007), they formulate desirable properties of such measures
but do not characterize specific classes. They suggest measures some of which allow for
diﬀerent treatment of diﬀerent time periods by means of discounting. They also address
the persistence issue but the proposed measure is very diﬀerent from ours and deals only
with poverty in the immediately preceding period without allowing the entire history of
individuals to matter.
It seems to us that the negative eﬀects of being in poverty are cumulative and de-
pend on experienced histories. Empirical evidence is in favor of this view. Individuals
who have been persistently poor are often discriminated against and “have little access
to productive assets and low capabilities in term of health, education and social capital”
(Chronic Poverty Research Centre, 2004, p.3). In addition, there is true state dependence
in poverty status since the chances of being poor in the future are higher for individuals
who are already poor, even after controlling for individual heterogeneity, observed and
unobserved. “For example, the experience of poverty itself might induce a loss of moti-
vation, lowering the chances that individuals with given attributes escape poverty in the
future” (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2004, p.598). Regarding children, Bradbury, Jenkins and
Micklewrite (2001) report that those who have been poor for a long time are worse oﬀ
than those who are poor in a single period only. Walker (1995, p.103) writes that “When
poverty predominantly occurs in long spells (...) the poor have virtually no chance of
escaping from poverty and, therefore, little allegiance to the wider community.”
The path-independence property mentioned above can be called into question in other
models of social evaluation as well. For example, in a framework where well-being is to be
aggregated across time and across individuals, aggregating across individuals first means
that, in the second step of the procedure, we do not have information on the period of
life of an individual–only aggregate per-period information is available. Hence, a given
per-period level of individual well-being has to be treated in the same way, no matter
in which period of life this level is achieved. This seems to be rather counter-intuitive
and restrictive, and the same reasoning applies to the issue of intertemporal poverty
measurement considered here. See, for instance, Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson (1996,
2005) for discussions.
Hoy and Zheng (2006) is, to the best of our knowledge, the only other contribution
that addresses the issue of intertemporal poverty measurement axiomatically and provides
characterization results. While axiomatic discussions are provided in Calvo and Dercon
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(2007) and in Foster (2007) as well, characterizations are absent and, therefore, the axioms
do not provide a justification for narrowing down the class of measures to those suggested
in these papers because it is not established that they are the only ones with the requisite
properties.
Our approach is not restricted to formulations involving a fixed poverty line–we allow
for any method to obtain individual per-period poverty indicators. In particular, use of
a relative poverty line, that is, using a percentage of average or median income as the
poverty line is compatible with our framework, and this is the procedure that is used in the
applied part of our paper. This is in contrast with Hoy and Zheng’s (2006) setting where
a fixed poverty line is essential in order to ensure that their path-independence axiom
is well-defined. Moreover, we do not assume the number of periods under consideration
to be fixed, thus allowing for a richer set of possible comparisons as compared to those
available in models where the time horizon is given.
The empirical and econometric literature on poverty measurement has recognized for
some time the importance of being able to distinguish between chronic and transitory
poverty and proposes alternative methods for capturing the relevant phenomenon; for
surveys of this literature, see, among others, Rodgers and Rodgers (1993) and Jenkins
(2000). Numerous applied contributions provide a detailed description of poverty persis-
tence in various countries and help in shaping social policies but the measures used are
established in an ad hoc fashion without much of a theoretical foundation. This paper
contributes to this literature by filling this gap. Specifically, some of the empirical litera-
ture involving persistence in poverty proceed by counting the proportion of people being
poor in each period. Alternatively, the percentage of ‘long’ poverty spells or the sequence
of multiple spells is used as a crude measure of intertemporal poverty. In order to try
to include information on the intensity of poverty, some authors capture the temporal
aspect of individual poverty by using a measure of permanent income and then applying
standard (static) indices of poverty such as members of the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke class
(Foster, Greer and Thorbecke, 1984) to the resulting distribution of permanent incomes.
See, for instance, Rodgers and Rodgers (1993, p.31) who use as permanent income “the
maximum sustainable annual consumption level that the agent could achieve with his or
her actual income stream over the same T years, if the agent could save and borrow at
prevailing interest rates.”
The main purpose of this paper is to provide an axiomatic foundation for the measure-
ment of intertemporal poverty that diﬀers from earlier approaches such as those of Hoy
and Zheng (2006), Calvo and Dercon (2007) and Foster (2007) in the way persistence is
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taken into consideration. Our measure pays attention to the length of individual poverty
spells by assigning a higher level of poverty to situations where, ceteris paribus, poverty
is experienced in consecutive rather than separated periods. In the theoretical part of
the paper, we provide a characterization of our new class of measures. In addition, we
characterize aggregate intertemporal poverty as the arithmetic mean of the individual
intertemporal poverty indices. In the applied part of the paper, we use our new aggregate
indices as well as measures suggested in the earlier literature to illustrate the commonali-
ties and the diﬀerences with alternative approaches. The application pertains to poverty
patterns among EU countries in the years from 1994 to 2001.
2 Individual Intertemporal Poverty Measures
This paper is concerned with the intertemporal aggregation of per-period individual
poverty indicators (such as relative poverty gaps or their square values) over time and
the across-society aggregation of these individual measures into a social measure of in-
tertemporal poverty. We begin with a discussion of individual intertemporal poverty and
its link to what we refer to as persistence. Suppose that individual poverty indicators are
observed in each of a non-empty and finite set of periods. A standard way of generating
these per-period indicators consists of defining them, in each period, as the diﬀerence
between a (constant or income-distribution-dependent) poverty line and the individual’s
income divided by the poverty line if its income is below this poverty line and as equal to
zero otherwise. We do not need to commit to a specific way of obtaining these indicators
and treat them, for simplicity, as the primary inputs for our analysis.
The novel feature we suggest in intertemporal poverty measurement is to take into
consideration the length of the poverty spells an individual is subjected to. For example,
suppose two per-period individual poverty profiles are compared, where the first profile
is given by (1/3, 1/2, 1/4, 1/2, 0) and the second by (1/3, 0, 1/2, 1/4, 1/2). We claim that
individual intertemporal poverty should be higher in the first than in the second: in the
second profile, the individual experiences a break from being in poverty rather than being
poor in four consecutive periods.
Moreover, the length of spells out of poverty matters in the sense that, ceteris paribus,
a longer break between poverty spells is better than a shorter break. For instance,
suppose we have two per-period individual poverty profiles (1/2, 0, 1/3, 1/4, 0, 1/2) and
(1/2, 0, 0, 1/3, 1/4, 0, 1/2). According to our hypothesis, the first of these profiles is asso-
ciated with a higher value of individual intertemporal poverty. The two profiles involve
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an identical triple of spells–namely, a one-period spell with a per-period poverty of 1/2,
a two-period spell with poverty values of 1/3 and 1/4, and another one-period spell with
poverty 1/2. However, there is one zero-poverty period separating the spells in the first
profile but a break of two periods in the second and, thus, intertemporal poverty is lower
in the second option.
As the second example illustrates, we include comparisons of poverty profiles of dif-
ferent length (and profiles coming from societies of possibly diﬀerent populations and
population sizes); this is essential in order to perform international comparisons involving
data sets with diﬀerent sampling periods. Let Ω = ∪T∈N RT+. For T ∈ N, an individ-
ual per-period individual poverty profile of dimension T is a vector pi ∈ RT+, where pti
is individual i’s poverty experienced in period t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. An individual intertem-
poral poverty measure is a function Pi : Ω → R+ where, for all pi ∈ Ω, Pi(pi) is the
intertemporal poverty experienced by person i.
The purpose of this paper is to formalize the idea that the lengths of poverty spells and
the lengths of spells out of poverty aﬀect individual intertemporal poverty. In this respect,
our approach diﬀers from that of Hoy and Zheng (2006). Furthermore, we do not restrict
attention to environments with a fixed poverty line–we allow for any method to obtain
individual per-period poverty indicators; in particular, the commonly-used procedure of
using a percentage of average or median income as the poverty line is compatible with
our setup, and this is the procedure that is used in the applied part of this paper.
The result of this section consists of a characterization of an individual intertemporal
poverty measure that reflects the length-of-spell hypothesis mentioned above. This basic
idea also motivates a characterization in the context of deriving measures of social exclu-
sion from measures of individual deprivation (Bossert, D’Ambrosio and Peragine, 2007),
where similar considerations apply. However, the axioms we employ are diﬀerent and we
obtain a diﬀerent class of measures as a consequence.
The first property we impose on an individual intertemporal poverty measure requires
that, in degenerate cases where there is only one period, individual intertemporal poverty
and individual per-period poverty coincide.
One-period equivalence. For all pi ∈ R+,
Pi(pi) = pi.
As is standard in many issues involving social index numbers (see, for instance, Ebert
and Moyes, 2000, in the context of individual deprivation measurement), we impose de-
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composability properties both across spells and within spells. Across spells, that is, in
situations where two groups of periods in poverty are separated by at least one period
with zero poverty, we require individual intertemporal poverty to be equal to a weighted
average of poverty experienced in each spell, where the weights are given by the propor-
tional lengths of the two spells. The scope of the axiom is restricted to separate spells
due to one of the features we want to highlight–the importance of the lengths of poverty
spells and spells out of poverty.
Across-spells average decomposability. For all T ∈ N \ {1}, for all pi ∈ RT+ and for
all t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, if pti = 0 or pt+1i = 0, then
Pi(pi) =
t
T
Pi(p1i , . . . , p
t
i) +
T − t
T
Pi(pt+1i , . . . , p
T
i ).
The second decomposability property applies to situations where there is but a single
poverty spell–that is, the individual is in poverty in all T periods. Individual intertempo-
ral poverty is a weighted average of individual poverty when the single spell is separated
into two sets of periods. The weights involve an exponential expression in addition to the
proportional lengths employed in the previous axiom. This is one possibility of requiring a
superadditive structure in consecutive periods of poverty but it is clearly not the only one;
alternative axioms, such as one that is based on linear rather than exponential weights
(see Bossert, D’Ambrosio and Peragine, 2007), could be employed.
Single-spell exponential decomposability. There exists c ≥ 1 such that, for all
T ∈ N \ {1}, for all pi ∈ RT++ and for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1},
Pi(pi) =
t
T
cT−t Pi(p1i , . . . , p
t
i) +
T − t
T
ct Pi(pt+1i , . . . , p
T
i ).
The restriction c ≥ 1 is imposed to ensure that the resulting measures are superadditive
in the lengths of poverty spells. For c = 1, the axiom extends the average-decomposability
property of the previous axiom to within-spell situations.
According to the class of measures we propose in this paper, individual intertemporal
poverty is calculated as the weighted average of the individual per-period poverty values
where, for each period, the weight is given by a generalized exponential function with base
γ ≥ 1. The argument of this exponential function is the length of the spell to which this
period belongs minus one. To formalize this notion, consider any T ∈ N and pi ∈ RT+. For
t ∈ {1, . . . , T} such that pti > 0, let Dt(pi) be the maximal number of consecutive periods
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including t with positive per-period poverty values. For t ∈ {1, . . . , T} such that pti = 0,
let Dt(pi) be the maximal number of consecutive periods including t with zero per-period
poverty. To illustrate this definition, consider the profile pi = (0, 1/2, 1/4, 1/3, 0, 0, 1/4) ∈
R7+. The length of the first non-poverty spell is one and, thus, D1(pi) = 1. This is followed
by a poverty spell of length three, which implies D2(pi) = D3(pi) = D4(pi) = 3. The next
two periods are periods out of poverty and we obtain D5(pi) = D6(pi) = 2. Finally, there
is a one-period poverty spell and we thus have D7(pi) = 1.
Foster’s (2007) measure is obtained when (i) attention is restricted to the chronically
poor; (ii) no importance is given to persistence (that is, the parameter γ is equal to one);
and (iii) the per-period individual poverty indicators are the gaps according to the indices
belonging to the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) class.
Our class of individual intertemporal poverty measures, parameterized by γ ≥ 1, is
now defined as
Pγi (pi) =
1
T
TX
τ=1
γD
τ (pi)−1pτi
for all T ∈ N and for all pi ∈ RT+. For example, if γ = 2, the individual intertemporal
poverty associated with the profile pi = (0, 1/2, 1/4, 1/3, 0, 0, 1/4) is
P2i (pi) =
1
7
7X
τ=1
2D
τ (pi)−1pτi
=
1
7
¡
20 · 0 + 22 · 1/2 + 22 · 1/4 + 22 · 1/3 + 21 · 0 + 21 · 0 + 20 · 1/4¢
=
1
7
(4 · 1/2 + 4 · 1/4 + 4 · 1/3 + 1 · 1/4) = 55
84
.
The axioms introduced above characterize the class Pγi . We obtain
Theorem 1 An individual intertemporal poverty measure Pi : Ω → R+ satisfies one-
period equivalence, across-spells average decomposability and single-spell exponential de-
composability if and only if there exists γ ≥ 1 such that Pi = Pγi .
Proof. ‘If.’ Let γ ≥ 1. That Pγi satisfies one-period equivalence is straightforward to
verify.
To prove across-spells average decomposability, let T ∈ N \ {1}, pi ∈ RT+ and t ∈
{1, . . . , T − 1} be such that pti = 0 or pt+1i = 0. By definition of Pγi , we have
t
T
Pγi (p
1
i , . . . , p
t
i) +
T − t
T
Pγi (p
t+1
i , . . . , p
T
i ) =
1
T
tX
τ=1
γD
τ (p1i ,...,p
t
i)−1pτi
+
1
T
TX
τ=t+1
γD
τ (pt+1i ,...,p
T
i )−1pτi . (1)
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Because pti = 0 or p
t+1
i = 0, it follows that D
τ (p1i , . . . , pti) = Dτ(pi) for all τ ∈ {1, . . . , t}
such that pτi > 0 andDτ (p
t+1
i , . . . , p
T
i ) = D
τ(pi) for all τ ∈ {t+1, . . . , T} such that pτi > 0.
Therefore, (1) implies
t
T
Pγi (p
1
i , . . . , p
t
i) +
T − t
T
Pγi (p
t+1
i , . . . , p
T
i ) =
1
T
TX
τ=1
γD
τ (pi)−1pτi = P
γ
i (pi),
as was to be established.
Let c = γ ≥ 1, T ∈ N\{1}, pi ∈ RT++ and t ∈ {1, . . . , T −1}. By definition of Pγi = Pci
and because Dτ(pi) = T for all τ ∈ {1, . . . , T}, it follows that
Pci(pi) =
1
T
TX
τ=1
cD
τ (pi)−1pτi =
1
T
TX
τ=1
cT−1pτi
=
cT−1
T
TX
τ=1
pτi =
cT−1
T
tX
τ=1
pτi +
cT−1
T
TX
τ=t+1
pτi
=
1
T
cT−1
ct−1
tX
τ=1
ct−1pτi +
1
T
cT−t
cT−t−1
TX
τ=t+1
cT−t−1pτi
=
t
T
cT−t Pci(p
1
i , . . . , p
t
i) +
T − t
T
ct Pci(p
t+1
i , . . . , p
T
i )
and single-spell exponential decomposability is proven.
‘Only if.’ Now suppose Pi satisfies the axioms of the theorem statement. Let T ∈ N
and pi ∈ RT+. If T = 1, Pi(pi) = pi = Pγi (pi) for all γ ≥ 1 follows immediately from
one-period equivalence.
Now consider the case T ≥ 2. If pτi = 0 for all τ ∈ {1, . . . , T}, repeated application
of one-period equivalence and across-spells average decomposability implies Pi(pi) = 0 =
Pγi (pi) for all γ ≥ 1.
If there exists τ ∈ {1, . . . , T} such that pτi > 0, we proceed by induction on the number
of poverty spells.
Suppose first that there is only one poverty spell, which means that pi ∈ RT++ and,
therefore, Dτ(pi) = T for all τ ∈ {1, . . . , T}. By repeated application of one-period
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equivalence and single-spell exponential decomposability, there exists c ≥ 1 such that
Pi(pi) =
c(T − 1)
T
Pi(p1i , . . . , p
T−1
i ) +
cT−1
T
Pi(pTi )
=
c(T − 1)
T
µ
c(T − 2)
T − 1 Pi(p
1
i , . . . , p
T−2
i ) +
cT−2
T − 1 p
T−1
i
¶
+
cT−1
T
pTi
=
c2(T − 2)
T
Pi(p1i , . . . , p
T−2
i ) +
cT−1
T
pT−1i +
cT−1
T
pTi
...
=
1
T
TX
τ=1
cT−1pτi = P
γ
i (pi) (2)
with γ = c ≥ 1.
To complete the induction argument, suppose (2) is true for all profiles with at most
M ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} poverty spells, and consider pi ∈ RT+ such that the number of poverty
spells is M + 1. Let t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} be such that the last poverty spell starts in
period t+1. By assumption, this implies that pti = 0; otherwise t+1 would not represent
the beginning of a separate poverty spell. Thus, we can employ across-spells average
decomposability twice to obtain
Pi(pi) =
t
T
Pi(p1i , . . . , p
t
i) +
T − t
T
Pi(pt+1i , . . . , p
T
i )
=
t
T
µ
t− 1
t
Pi(p1i , . . . , p
t−1
i ) +
1
t
Pi(0)
¶
+
T − t
T
Pi(pt+1i , . . . , p
T
i )
=
t− 1
T
Pi(p1i , . . . , p
t−1
i ) +
1
T
Pi(0) +
T − t
T
Pi(pt+1i , . . . , p
T
i ).
By the induction hypothesis and one-period equivalence, it follows that
Pi(pi) =
t− 1
T
Pγi (p
1
i , . . . , p
t−1
i ) + 0 +
T − t
T
Pγi (p
t+1
i , . . . , p
T
i )
=
1
T
t−1X
τ=1
γD
τ (p1i ,...,p
t−1
i )−1pτi +
1
T
pti +
1
T
TX
τ=t+1
γD
τ (pt+1i ,...,p
T
i )−1pτi .
Because pti = 0 , it follows that Dτ (p1i , . . . , p
t−1
i ) = D
τ(pi) for all τ ∈ {1, . . . , t − 1} such
that pτi > 0 and Dτ (p
t+1
i , . . . , p
T
i ) = D
τ (pi) for all τ ∈ {t + 1, . . . , T} such that pτi > 0,
which implies Pi(pi) = P
γ
i (pi).
3 Aggregate Intertemporal Poverty Measures
Given the individual intertemporal poverty measuresPγi for each individual in a society, we
use an aggregate intertemporal poverty index to obtain an overall measure of poverty that
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allows us to compare intertemporal poverty across societies, possibly involving diﬀerent
sampling periods and diﬀerent populations and population sizes. Although it is possible to
define an aggregate intertemporal measure from first principles (that is, using individual
per-period poverty indicators as the basic objects to be aggregated into societal poverty),
we proceed by implicitly assuming that the intertemporal aggregation is performed first
(see the discussion in the Introduction) and the second step consists of aggregating these
indicators across individuals in a society to arrive at an overall measure of intertemporal
poverty. This choice is motivated primarily by our desire to keep the exposition simple.
To describe the second part of the aggregation process, let Π = ∪n∈NRn+ and consider
a function P : Π → R+, to be interpreted as a measure that assigns an aggregate value
of intertemporal poverty to each vector of individual intertemporal poverty values. To
justify the rich domain of this measure, assume that the procedure to aggregate individual
intertemporal poverty is independent of the specific way the per-period individual poverty
values are determined–in particular, they could be determined by poverty gaps divided by
a fixed poverty line (or the squares of these values) for any given level of this fixed poverty
line. It is clear that, for any population size n ∈ N, any vector p = (p1, . . . ,pn) ∈ Rn+
of individual intertemporal poverty values according to the measure characterized in the
previous section can be obtained by choosing a suitable poverty line and a suitable income
distribution so that the resulting vector of individual intertemporal poverty measures is
given by p.
The aggregate intertemporal poverty measure we propose is defined as average indi-
vidual intertemporal poverty, that is, we employ the index PΓ defined by
PΓ(p) =
1
n
nX
i=1
pi (3)
for all n ∈ N and for all p ∈ Rn+. We view aggregate poverty as an ordinal variable
and, thus, any increasing transformation of PΓ can equivalently be employed. Of course,
individual intertemporal poverty measures must contain more than ordinal and interper-
sonally non-comparable information–clearly, the definition ofPΓ is incompatible with the
assumption that the p carry ordinally measurable and interpersonally non-comparable in-
formation only. We provide a characterization of PΓ that is based on results in population
ethics due to Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson (2002, 2005). However, we provide a self-
contained proof because the domain we consider here is diﬀerent from the one in these
contributions.
The first axiom is a weak monotonicity property. It requires that, in situations where
the level of individual poverty is equal across individuals, aggregate intertemporal poverty
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is increasing in individual intertemporal poverty. The scope of the axiom is restricted to
comparisons involving a given population size. For any n ∈ N, let 1n denote the vector
consisting of n ones.
Minimal increasingness. For all n ∈ N and for all a, b ∈ R+, if a > b, then
P(a1n) > P(b1n).
Minimal increasingness is a very mild monotonicity requirement because it applies to equal
distributions of individual intertemporal poverty and to fixed-population-size comparisons
only.
The second axiom we impose on P is an impartiality property with respect to increases
or decreases in individual poverty. If a single individual’s intertemporal poverty level
changes by a given amount, it does not matter whose poverty changes. Let n ≥ 2.
We use the notation 1jn for the vector w ∈ Rn+ such that wj = 1 and wi = 0 for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {j}.
Incremental equity. For all n ∈ N \ {1}, for all p ∈ Rn+, for all d ∈ R and for all
j, k ∈ {1, . . . , n} with j 6= k, if (p+ d1jn) ∈ Rn+ and (p+ d1kn) ∈ Rn+, then
P
¡
p+ d1jn
¢
= P
¡
p+ d1kn
¢
.
Minimal increasingness and incremental equity together characterize ordinal aggregate
poverty measures based on average (or total) individual poverty for any fixed population
size; see Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson (2002, 2005). However, further axioms are
needed to extend this characterization to the entire domain Π, that is, to aggregate
poverty comparisons that may involve diﬀerent population sizes. One possibility is to
require that average individual poverty is a critical level for any poverty vector p ∈ Π;
see, again, Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson (2005) for a detailed discussion. That is,
aggregate poverty is unaﬀected if an individual with average poverty is added to a given
distribution p ∈ Π.
Average critical levels. For all n ∈ N and for all p ∈ Rn+,
P
Ã
p,
1
n
nX
i=1
pi
!
= P(p).
12
The three axioms defined above characterize the class of all aggregate poverty measures
that are ordinally equivalent to PΓ. The axioms can be motivated further by noting
that they are implied by other properties with intuitive interpretations. For instance,
minimal increasingness is a consequence of standard increasingness, incremental equity is
implied by a fixed-population information-invariance property and average critical levels
is implied by increasingness, the existence of critical levels and a variable-population
information-invariance condition; see Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson (2005, Chs. 4—6)
for a detailed discussion. In the statement of the following theorem, we use ◦ to denote
function composition.
Theorem 2 An aggregate intertemporal poverty measure P satisfies minimal increasing-
ness, incremental equity and average critical levels if and only if there exists an increasing
function ϕ : R+ → R+ such that P = ϕ ◦PΓ.
Proof. That any increasing transformation of PΓ satisfies minimal increasingness, incre-
mental equity and average critical levels is straightforward to verify.
Conversely, suppose thatP satisfies the three axioms. If n = 1, minimal increasingness
alone implies the result.
Now let n ≥ 2. Consider p ∈ Rn+ and j, k ∈ {1, . . . , n} with j 6= k, and suppose
d ∈ R+ is such that pj ≥ d. By incremental equity,
P(p− d1jn + d1kn) = P(p− d1jn + d1jn) = P(p). (4)
Let p ∈ Rn+ and suppose, without loss of generality, that p1 ≥ p2 ≥ . . . ≥ pn. By
(repeated if necessary) application of (4), it follows that
P(p) = P
Ã
p1 −
Ã
p1 −
1
n
nX
i=1
pi
!
,p2, . . . ,pn +
Ã
p1 −
1
n
nX
i=1
pi
!!
= P
Ã
1
n
nX
i=1
pi,p2, . . . ,pn + p1 −
1
n
nX
i=1
pi
!
...
= P
Ã
1
n
nX
i=1
pi,
1
n
nX
i=1
pi, . . . ,
nX
i=1
pi −
n− 1
n
nX
i=1
pi
!
= P
ÃÃ
1
n
nX
i=1
pi
!
1n
!
.
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Together with minimal increasingness, this implies
P(p) ≥ P(q) ⇔ P
ÃÃ
1
n
nX
i=1
pi
!
1n
!
≥ P
ÃÃ
1
n
nX
i=1
qi
!
1n
!
⇔ 1
n
nX
i=1
pi ≥
1
n
nX
i=1
qi
⇔ PΓ(p) ≥ PΓ(q)
⇔ ϕ(PΓ(p)) ≥ ϕ(PΓ(q)) (5)
for all n ∈ N, for all p,q ∈ Rn+ and for all increasing functions ϕ : R+ → R+. Thus, all
fixed-population-size comparisons must be performed according to PΓ.
Now consider n,m ∈ N such that n 6= m, p ∈ Rn+ and q ∈ Rm+ . Without loss of
generality, suppose n > m. By (repeated if necessary) application of average critical
levels, we obtain
P(q) = P
Ã
q,
1
m
mX
i=1
qi
!
= . . . = P
Ã
q,
Ã
1
m
mX
i=1
qi
!
1n−m
!
and, therefore,
P(p) ≥ P(q) ⇔ P(p) ≥ P
Ã
q,
Ã
1
m
mX
i=1
qi
!
1n−m
!
. (6)
Because p and (q, ((1/m)
Pm
i=1 qi)1n−m) have the same population size n, (5) implies
P(p) ≥ P
Ã
q,
Ã
1
m
mX
i=1
qi
!
1n−m
!
⇔ 1
n
nX
i=1
pi ≥
1
n
Ã
mX
i=1
qi +
n−m
m
mX
i=1
qi
!
⇔
nX
i=1
pi ≥
mX
i=1
qi +
n−m
m
mX
i=1
qi
which implies
P(p) ≥ P
Ã
q,
Ã
1
m
mX
i=1
qi
!
1n−m
!
⇔ 1
n
nX
i=1
pi ≥
1
m
mX
i=1
qi.
By (6), we obtain
P(p) ≥ P(q) ⇔ 1
n
nX
i=1
pi ≥
1
m
mX
i=1
qi ⇔ PΓ(p) ≥ PΓ(q) ⇔ ϕ(PΓ(p)) ≥ ϕ(PΓ(q))
for any increasing function ϕ : R+ → R+, which completes the proof.
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4 An Application to European Countries
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the aggregate measure of poverty, PΓ as defined
in (3) with individual intertemporal poverty measures pi given by P
γ
i (pi) for diﬀerent pa-
rameter values γ, using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). We base our
analysis on all the waves available in ECHP, which cover the period from 1994 to 2001.
The surveys are conducted at a European national level. We do not aim at providing
an accurate analysis of poverty persistence in EU countries, hence we take the available
years as such without considering the possibility that poverty spells are censored at the
beginning or at the end of the sample we observe. (For a discussion of these estimation
techniques see, among others, Bane and Ellwood, 1986, and Jenkins, 2000.) The ECHP
is an ambitious eﬀort at collecting information on the living standards of the households
of the EU member states using common definitions, information collection methods and
editing procedures. It contains detailed information on incomes, socio-economic charac-
teristics, housing amenities, consumer durables, social relations, employment conditions,
health status, subjective evaluation of well-being, etc.. Of the 15 EU member states, we
could not consider Sweden since the data for this country is cross-sectional only. For Fin-
land and Austria, data were not available for all the waves. While the former joined from
wave three onwards, the Austrian data are available beginning with the second wave. The
full ECHP data format for the UK, Germany and Luxembourg is available only for the
years 1994—1996. We therefore use the ECHP data format derived from national surveys
instead. These data are available for the UK and Germany for 1994—2001; for Luxem-
bourg, on the other hand, they are available from 1995 onwards only. For this reason,
Luxembourg, like Austria, was included from the second wave onwards. The unit of our
analysis is the individual. The calculation uses required sample weights. Since we are
interested in analyzing poverty spells and the eﬀect of persistence in the state of poverty,
we consider only individuals that were interviewed in all the waves for each country. The
variable studied is net yearly household income equivalized using the OECD-modified
equivalence scale in order to account for diﬀerent household size and composition. For
each country and for each period in the sample, the poverty line is set to 60% of the
national median. Thus, for any given per-period income distribution yt, the poverty line
in this period, zt(yt), is given by 0.6 times the median of yt. An individual is classified as
poor if its income is strictly below the poverty line.
It has been assumed that the parameter γ takes on its values in the set {1, . . . , 10}.
An increase in the value of γ indicates that higher weight is assigned to the persistence
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of individual poverty.
For the per-period individual poverty indicators, we choose three among the most
commonly used ones in empirical studies, namely, the normalized relative gaps raised to
the power α ∈ {0, 1, 2} so that, for any period t ∈ N,
pti =
⎧
⎨
⎩
³
zt(yt)−yti
zt(yt)
´α
if yti < zt(yt),
0 if yti ≥ zt(yt).
The individual index is then the product of two components: the weight and the
individual poverty indicator. When α = 0, the individual poverty indicator captures
only the number of periods spent in poverty. In this case, pti assumes the value one for
those in poverty and zero for everybody else. This individual index is similar in spirit to
the head-count ratio. When α = 1, we consider not only the incidence of poverty but
also its intensity since we take into account how poor each poor individual is expressed
as a proportion of the poverty line. In this case, the index resembles the normalized
poverty gap. When α = 2, the normalized gaps are squared. As a result, we give more
importance to poorer individuals as opposed to those poor whose income is less distant
from the poverty line.
When the parameter γ is equal to one, persistence does not play a role. This is the
only case where aggregating first across time and then across individuals produces exactly
the same results as the reverse order of aggregation does, that is, aggregating first across
individuals and then across time. The aggregate index coincides with the average of
per-period standard poverty indices. If, in addition, α = 0, the aggregate index is the
average of the per-period head-count ratios; if α = 1, it is the average of the aggregate
normalized poverty gap indices; and, lastly, if α = 2, it is the average of the aggregate
squared normalized poverty gaps.
Results are contained in Table 1, while in Table 2 we report the rankings of the
countries under alternative indices. In the first column the names of the countries are
reported while the following ten columns present poverty indicators for diﬀerent values
of γ. In Panel a, the individual poverty indicators capture only the incidence of poverty
and when γ = 1, the index is the mean of per-period head-count ratios. In Panel b, the
intensity of poverty plays a role and when γ = 1 the index is the mean of per-period
normalized poverty gaps. In Panel c, the shortfalls from the poverty line (as a proportion
of the line itself) are squared and when γ = 1 the index is the mean of per-period
normalized squared poverty gaps. The results show that persistence in a state of poverty
does play a major role in poverty measurement. It constitutes relevant information and its
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omission would not give a correct picture of the phenomenon. As the weight of persistence
in the index increases, the rankings of the countries change, particularly among the least
poor. Portugal, followed by Greece, is indeed always the poorest country among those
under analysis. At the opposite end of the ranking the situation is very diﬀerent. Finland
occupies the second position according to standard poverty measurement, that is when γ =
1; as soon as we increase the value of the persistence parameter to 2 Finland jumps to the
first position implying that there is less persistence in poverty in this country than in the
Netherlands when α = 0, and in Denmark for the other two cases. Of high interest is the
case of Denmark and Austria. Poverty is a very diﬀerent phenomenon in these countries.
Denmark’s position worsens heavily as the weight of persistence considerations increases
for all individual poverty indicators: it is relegated from the first to the fourth (see Panel b)
or fifth (see Panel c) position and from the third to the fifth when the intensity of poverty
is not considered (see Panel a). Austria, on the other hand, experiences the reverse
phenomenon moving from the sixth to the third (see Panel b and c) or to the second
(see Panel a) position. Similar observations apply to Luxembourg (with one exception
in Panel b, third column). From a social policy point of view the discovery of this
temporal characteristic of poverty should lead to diﬀerent recommendations: in a country
like Denmark, for example, policy should aim at helping individuals and households to
escape from poverty; in Austria, on the other hand, a more eﬀective policy would be one
preventing individuals from becoming poor.
5 Concluding Remarks
Individuals live and time is an important aspect of their lives. Experiences matter and
persistence of experiences could matter more, as in the case of poverty. The indices we
propose aim at adding past experiences to the incidence of poverty and inequality among
those who are poor when measuring poverty. Information on the time spent in poverty
should not be neglected. The results of our simple application to EU countries show that
a very diﬀerent picture can emerge when we value individuals’ experiences.
Various extensions of the approach proposed in this paper are possible.
We restrict attention to the intertemporal aggregation of per-period overall poverty in
this paper. However, our approach can be modified easily in order to obtain a measure
of chronic poverty (Foster, 2007) based on the idea underlying our new index. To do so,
chronic poverty can be defined by setting an additional duration line and declaring an
individual to be chronically poor if there is at least one poverty spell of at least a given
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length and then perform the aggregation over individuals by calculating the arithmetic
mean of the poverty values only of all those satisfying this criterion.
Further works could in addition perform statistical inference with the indices we pro-
posed and consider the possibility when estimating intertemporal poverty that poverty
spells are censored.
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Table 1: Aggregate Intertemporal Poverty in EU Member States (Index Values). 
Panel a: Per-Period Individual Poverty Indicator with 0=α  
 
Country 1=γ  2=γ  3=γ  4=γ  5=γ  6=γ  7=γ  8=γ  9=γ  10=γ  
Denmark 0.0175 0.3780 5.1994 36.7818 171.2735 606.134 1769.95 4485.15 10194.18 21259.69
Finland 0.0175 0.2573 1.7070 6.8448 20.3677 49.91639 106.8015 206.728 370.5226 624.8557
Luxembourg 0.0206 0.5316 5.2963 28.4377 106.1073 312.741 781.9052 1731.73 3494.949 6553.489
Netherlands 0.0235 0.4516 5.5139 36.2835 161.3318 553.1483 1578.484 3930.76 8812.724 18177.42
Germany 0.0279 1.1359 17.3123 125.0316 585.4653 2075.033 6060.015 15351 34872.57 72684.86
Austria 0.0283 0.6516 6.6158 35.8669 134.5147 397.7055 996.4105 2210.13 4465.517 8380.908
Belgium 0.0315 1.1247 16.9126 121.8367 570.2505 2021.311 5904.618 14961.6 33997.28 70878.3
France 0.0328 1.3367 20.4430 147.8494 692.8390 2456.778 7177.283 18185.6 41319.83 86135.65
Ireland 0.0351 1.2929 19.0648 135.7653 630.8301 2224.916 6475.882 16364 37104.05 77221.22
UK 0.0480 1.8914 27.6901 196.6636 912.8886 3218.433 9366.074 23665.9 53659.66 111678.2
Italy 0.0578 2.2606 33.1681 235.7147 1094.5230 3859.727 11234.5 28391.4 64382.98 134011.1
Spain 0.0581 1.8840 27.4036 195.1768 908.7242 3211.807 9365.813 23704.4 53820.46 112140.8
Greece 0.0671 2.9364 44.6910 322.0719 1505.9580 5332.223 15561.26 39397.5 89460.2 186396.7
Portugal 0.0715 3.3758 50.0419 355.4550 1647.7750 5801.189 16861.48 42560.5 96415.88 200513.3
Panel b: Per-Period Individual Poverty Indicator with 1=α  
 
Country 1=γ  2=γ  3=γ  4=γ  5=γ  6=γ  7=γ  8=γ  9=γ  10=γ  
Denmark 0.0056 0.0992 1.3033 9.1169 42.2823 149.3645 435.740 1103.585 2507.471 5228.14
Finland 0.0059 0.0793 0.5147 2.0485 6.0753 14.8631 31.768 61.451 110.090 185.599
Luxembourg 0.0059 0.1519 1.5143 8.1353 30.3695 89.5458 223.948 496.111 1001.440 1878.14
Ireland 0.0114 0.3899 5.7941 41.5052 193.5661 684.3954 1995.546 5049.284 11460.650 23871.7
Netherlands 0.0122 0.2036 2.4307 15.7959 69.5609 236.6840 671.277 1663.274 3713.604 7633.16
Austria 0.0123 0.3003 3.1078 16.9823 63.9600 189.6012 475.878 1056.913 2137.572 4014.91
Germany 0.0131 0.5138 7.7770 56.0281 262.0120 927.8723 2708.255 6857.545 15573.150 32450.7
Belgium 0.0133 0.4570 6.9459 50.3817 236.8219 841.8787 2464.427 6254.398 14229.440 29695.2
France 0.0135 0.5059 7.7562 56.2118 263.7342 935.9132 2735.656 6934.250 15760.110 32861.4
UK 0.0217 0.8793 12.9039 91.6582 425.3578 1499.1520 4361.445 11017.440 24975.090 51968.6
Spain 0.0290 0.9857 14.4119 102.7987 479.0183 1694.0250 4942.021 12512.280 28416.810 59223.1
Italy 0.0306 1.2719 18.8898 134.8874 627.9591 2218.0350 6463.242 16347.010 37093.050 77245.9
Greece 0.0329 1.5105 23.1207 166.8333 780.4162 2763.7310 8066.126 20422.240 46373.550 96622.9
Portugal 0.0371 1.7591 25.8889 183.0247 845.7083 2970.5050 8618.869 21725.570 49163.440 102153
Panel c: Per-Period Individual Poverty Indicator with 2=α  
Country 1=γ  2=γ  3=γ  4=γ  5=γ  6=γ  7=γ  8=γ  9=γ  10=γ  
Netherlands 0.0868 1.7107 20.8059 136.8829 609.36 2092.32 5979.077 14907.88 33460.15 69082.5
Finland 0.0937 1.3148 8.6823 34.7584 103.33 253.0727 541.2151 1047.203 1876.362 3163.57
Denmark 0.0963 2.0270 27.6766 195.2880 908.22 3211.848 9374.401 23747.51 53962.2 112516
Germany 0.1069 3.8645 58.5503 422.9942 1982.14 7029.736 20540.72 52054.87 118293.3 246629
Luxembourg 0.1136 2.5472 24.9206 133.1780 495.945 1460.231 3648.493 8077.062 16295.93 30549.9
Austria 0.1156 2.2580 22.1169 118.3555 440.919 1298.293 3243.738 7180.503 14486.02 27155.1
Belgium 0.1339 4.5511 66.9738 477.0555 2217.06 7820.253 22762.73 57520.27 130421.9 271432
France 0.1438 4.9846 74.0871 530.8611 2476.24 8756.273 25532.97 64607.68 146646.3 305455
UK 0.1761 6.2017 89.4302 631.7939 2924.72 10294.24 29924.76 75553.84 171210.5 356169
Italy 0.1806 5.6926 81.0528 570.4175 2635.75 9267.133 26919.85 67932.74 153882.4 320028
Ireland 0.1868 6.3118 90.7736 639.6769 2954.82 10381.99 30137.26 76002.93 172064.8 357663
Spain 0.1904 5.2128 74.0989 524.3173 2433.59 8585.312 25003.85 63225.83 143453.7 298738
Greece 0.2008 7.1498 106.2620 761.0029 3548.64 12545.99 36578.84 92548.94 210051.9 437500
Portugal 0.2201 8.9531 131.5753 934.8185 4338.69 15292.78 44494.04 112403.1 254815.7 530248
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Table 2: Aggregate Intertemporal Poverty in EU Member States (Rankings). 
Country 1=γ  2=γ  3=γ  4=γ  5=γ  6=γ  7=γ  8=γ  9=γ  10=γ
Netherlands 1 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Finland 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Denmark 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Germany 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Luxembourg 5 5 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Austria 6 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Belgium 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
France 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
UK 9 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Italy 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Ireland 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Spain 12 9 9 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Greece 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
Portugal 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Panel a: Per-Period Individual Poverty Indicator with 0=α  
 
Country 1=γ  2=γ  3=γ  4=γ  5=γ  6=γ  7=γ  8=γ  9=γ  10=γ
Denmark 1 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Finland 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Luxembourg 3 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Netherlands 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Germany 5 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Austria 6 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Belgium 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
France 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Ireland 9 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
UK 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 10
Italy 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Spain 12 10 10 10 10 10 10 11 11 11
Greece 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
Portugal 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Panel b: Per-Period Individual Poverty Indicator with 1=α  
 
Country 1=γ  2=γ  3=γ  4=γ  5=γ  6=γ  7=γ  8=γ  9=γ  10=γ
Denmark 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4
Finland 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Luxembourg 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Ireland 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Netherlands 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5
Austria 6 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 3
Germany 7 9 9 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Belgium 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
France 9 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
UK 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Spain 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Italy 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Greece 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
Portugal 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Panel c: Per-Period Individual Poverty Indicator with 2=α  
